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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF CASINO TAX POLICY ON SHORT-RUN GAMING
DEVELOPMENT
by
Kahlil Simeon Philander
Dr. Bo J. Bernhard, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of William F. Harrah College of Hotel Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study examines the effect of casino tax rate structure on investment by
casino operators. Using a panel data set consisting of all states with legal commercial
casino gambling from 1998 to 2009, a fixed-effect model with two-stage least squares
is estimated to examine the effect of gambling taxes on firms’ short-run behavior. The
study finds that maximum casino tax rates decrease casino employment, with an esti-
mated average elasticity of -0.5. This result is noted to be robust to several different
model specifications and data subsets. No robust relationship is found between maxi-
mum tax rates and casino wages. No significant relationship is found between effective
tax rates and casino employment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Casino gaming is often cited as a desirable source to target for government tax
revenue (Adam Rose and Associates, 1998; Chapman et al., 1997; Eadington, 1996,
1998; Smith, 1998). However, the way that gaming taxes are structured varies signif-
icantly from one jurisdiction to another, and even tends to differ sizeably within the
same country. Although some variation is sensible, as each jurisdiction has a different
market structure, the different tax policy decisions frequently seem to be made on an ad
hoc basis, without full consideration to the complete economic impacts of those deci-
sions (Anderson, 2005). This study is designed to provide guidance to policy makers,
academics, and firms of how casino excise tax policy decisions can affect the economic
impact of casino gaming.
Overview
In this chapter, the importance of the study is highlighted and the research ques-
tions that will be addressed through an extensive review of literature and a carefully
designed empirical study are provided. Chapter two includes a summary of the tax the-
ory related to gambling, a description of the relevant empirical studies on gaming eco-
nomics and policy, and a discussion of the limitations and implications of existing aca-
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demic literature. This overview of literature includes a review of how the presence of
addiction and negative externalities in a small portion of the population may affect the
generalizability of common economic theory. In chapter three, the econometric method-
ology that will be used in this study is described. In chapter four, the empirical results
of a secondary data analysis on casino tax rates are provided. Finally, in chapter five,
the potential applications of the results from this study are discussed, followed by dis-
cussion of considerations that should be made when designing a gaming tax structure.
Importance of Study
Both in the U.S. and throughout the World, gaming markets do not exhibit uni-
form structures, nor do they appear to follow any consistent economic guidelines –
market structures vary from monopolies (typically run by or heavily taxed by govern-
ment) to near perfectly competitive markets (which are typically taxed at a much lower
rate) (Christiansen, 2005). In many jurisdictions, gaming policy has been shaped by the
desire to raise (and perhaps maximize) public revenues (Adam Rose and Associates,
1998; Chapman et al., 1997; Eadington, 1996, 1998; Paldam, 2008; Smith, 1998), and
to appease societal norms (Bernhard, 2007; Preston, Bernhard, Hunter, & Bybee, 1998).
Indeed, the political economy of gaming in many jurisdictions has led to ad hoc policy
making procedures, which may have ignored positivist theory and lead to unintended
economic consequences. As noted by Gazel (1998):
”...with a few exceptions, many state and local economies in the United
States have, most likely, experienced net monetary losses due to casino
2
gambling in their jurisdictions. One of the major reasons for such negative
impacts is the strategy of the monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure
chosen by the new jurisdictions.” p.831
This study attempts to highlight and estimate a potentially unintended conse-
quence of gaming tax policy design, the effect that the gross gaming revenue (GGR)
excise tax (the primary policy tool used to tax the casino industry) has on economic
development by commercial casino operators.
The revenue generated from gaming taxes is often highlighted by politicians and
other stakeholders as the most important indicator of the economic impact of casino
gaming; but in actuality, gaming taxes are only a portion of the overall importance
of the industry to the economy. Direct employment, income, gross domestic product
(GDP), and other indicators of general economic activity are all important to regional
economies, and policy decisions that affect these variables are critical to understand.
Governments, which often view gaming as a source of tax revenue (Adam Rose and
Associates, 1998; Chapman et al., 1997; Eadington, 1996, 1998; Smith, 1998; Walker
& Jackson, 2008), should balance their effort to generate public funds against the dele-
terious effects that higher tax rates have on equilibrium levels in the gaming market.
1Of course, the pecuniary estimates of the effect of legal casino gambling have been
widely disputed in the literature (Collins & Lapsley, 2003; Eadington, 1996, 1999a;
Walker, 2007b), but notwithstanding those debates, the points made by Gazel (1998) on
the effect of market structures retain some validity. Anderson (2005) has also suggested
that the wide variation in tax rates that have been applied to gaming revenue warrants
further economic analysis.
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Figure 1. U.S. 2010 Gross Gaming Taxes by State
Empirically, it has been unclear how the selection of tax rate policy has af-
fected incentives for casino investment. This may have contributed to significant vari-
ation in gaming tax rates charged across jurisdictions. As shown in Figure 1, maximum
commercial casino tax rates in the U.S. varied from roughly 55% in Pennsylvania to
roughly 7.75% in Nevada in 2010 (American Gaming Association, 2011). Variation
in gaming tax rates is not limited to the U.S.. In the EU, gross tax rates on lotteries
vary from a low of 12% in Estonia to a high of 50% in Poland (Forrest, 2008). Albon
(1997) also found a similar theme of tax rate variation in the Australian market.2
2It should be noted that since gaming taxes are all applied in different manners by
each jurisdiction, comparisons can sometimes be misleading. For example, 12% of the
Pennsylvania tax is a transfer to the horse racing industry and their table games are also
taxed at a lower rate; in addition to their ad valorum tax, Nevada also levies fees on gam-
ing devices. This study focuses on the maximum gross gaming revenue excise tax applied
commercial casino gaming, and the effective tax applied to gross gaming revenue.
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To highlight the differences in policy approaches, consider the two neighboring
states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. In 2010, Pennsylvania, with its 55% gaming
tax rate, generated close to four times the tax revenue of New Jersey’s gaming industry,
whose gaming revenue was taxed at 9.25% ($1.3 billion in Pennsylvania gaming tax
revenue as compared to $306 million in New Jersey). However, the New Jersey com-
mercial gaming industry employed close to three times as many people as the Penn-
sylvania commercial gaming industry (12,664 employees in Pennsylvania as compared
to 34,145 employees in New Jersey)(American Gaming Association, 2010). Although
there are many different factors that affect the different levels of tax revenue and em-
ployment in these two states, clearly, in terms of the casino industry’s overall impor-
tance to the economy, tax revenues alone can be a misleading figure. Meich (2008)
makes a similar argument in comparing the Nevada and Illinois gaming industries.
The welfare implications of developing a better understood tax system may be
sizeable. The U.S. commercial casino industry alone employs 340,564 workers per year
and contributes $7.59 billion in tax revenue to state and local governments in the U.S.
(American Gaming Association, 2011). The total worldwide gaming industry was es-
timated to generate $117.6 billion in annual revenue in 2010 (PwC, 2011). Using the
REMI economic impact model and some basic assumptions, Schmidt, Barr, and Swan-
son (1997) estimated that a four percent federal gaming tax would decrease jobs in
Clark County by 11,454. Although this number appears to only be a very rough esti-
mate, if it is close to the true effect in terms of order of magnitude, the importance of
having a well regulated gaming market should be clear.
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Research Questions
To date, no study has sought to empirically estimate the effect that casino ex-
cise taxes have on the decisions made by firms. This may have led to decision makers
making uniformed decisions, and may have contributed to the wide array of market
structures and tax policies observed in jurisdictions around the World. Although some
studies such as Christiansen (2005) or Thompson (2011) have offered discussion of this
issue, these studies have tended to be mostly qualitative descriptions that relied on en-
dogenous cross-section correlation to support their findings. In this study, a multivariate
approach is employed, intended to control for potential endogeneity from tax policies
and market structures that are defined simultaneously by governments. Specifically, the
following research questions are posed:
1. Maximum gross gaming revenue tax rates ⇒ Employment:
What is the effect of a change in the maximum GGR tax rate on commercial
casino employment?
2. Maximum gross gaming revenue tax rates ⇒ Wages:
What is the effect of a change in the maximum GGR tax rate on commercial
casino wages?
3. Effective gross gaming revenue tax rates ⇒ Employment:
What is the effect of a change in the effective GGR tax rate on commercial casino
employment?
4. Effective gross gaming revenue tax rates ⇒ Wages:
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What is the effect of a change in the effective GGR tax rate on commercial casino
wages?
5. Admission tax ⇒ Employment:
What is the effect of an admission tax on commercial casino employment?
6. Admission tax ⇒ Wages:
What is the effect of an admission tax on commercial casino wages?
In the absence of having firm level data available, the maximum tax rate is an
appealing metric to study since it tends to reflect the marginal tax paid by the largest
firms.3 The effective tax rate is also interesting independent variable since it describes
the average tax rate paid by firms, and therefore may capture some of the effects on
smaller casinos. Although economic theory would suggest that firms only make de-
cisions based on marginal rates, the effective tax may provide additional explanatory
power in what tends to be a non-linear tax (as a function of gross revenue). Finally, ad-
mission taxes are an interesting policy tool to study since they are a retail gaming tax
but are somewhat different from gross gaming revenue taxes as they do not directly tax
consumption – an analogy to this design is a tax by a policy maker who wishes to re-
duce greenhouse gases from automobiles, but instead of levying a tax on the sale of
fuel, he levies an (admission) tax on the sale of cars. It should be noted that admis-
sion taxes are generally levied as a secondary source of public revenue, on top of gross
gaming revenue taxes.
3Relevant to this discussion, there is evidence of economies of scale in the casino
industry (Gu, 2001).
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Limitations
This empirical study focuses on the effect of commercial casino taxation in the
U.S. at the state level. As such, the estimates will reflect statewide average effects,
and may not be indicative of decision making at the firm level, or for states that do
not reflect the average effect. Given the nature of how gambling is provided in other
countries, the results from this study may not be generalizable beyond the U.S. border,
as many intangible factors are known affect the gaming market, such as competitive
philosophies, culture, and politics – as noted by Eadington (1999b)
...jurisdictions have undertaken fundamentally different approaches in in-
troducing casino and casino-style gambling on such issues as ownership,
market structure, permitted locations, and operating constraints. These dif-
ferent approaches reflect diverse philosophic, political and cultural views on
how best to exploit the gains associated with allowing casinos, while at the
same time mitigating negative side effects and political backlash related to
permitted gambling. (p.134)
Implicit in the method chosen for the analysis, the assumptions required of re-
gression analysis are presumed to hold. Those assumptions are empirically tested where
possible, and are noted where tests cannot be performed. As this study relies on sec-
ondary data amalgamated from several different sources, the findings rely on the pre-
sumption that the acquired data is accurate and reliable.
This study is also limited by the availability of data, and the limitations of that
data set. For example, the availability of neighbouring jurisdiction gaming, tribal gam-
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ing, online gaming, and other substitutionary goods would surely enable a more accu-
rate estimate of the model coefficients. However, the ability to retrieve such data– and
estimate a model over a sufficiently large sample that satisfies the central limit theorem
– is not wholly feasible. This issue of potential misspecification extends to more ab-
stract variables such as local attitudes towards gaming and local market structure. To
address these limitations, carefully applied proxy variables are used, and other methods
to address endogeneity are applied.
Definitions
Admission tax: A tax levied for each patron entering a casino. Typically these have
been applied on riverboats in Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri (Anderson, 2005).
Commercial casino: A land-based, riverboat, or dockside casino as defined by the
American Gaming Association (American Gaming Association, 2010). This does
not include tribal casinos or card rooms.4
Effective tax rate: Total tax revenue from gaming excise taxes divided by total gross
gaming revenue (American Gaming Association, 2010).
Elasticity: The percentage change in one variable given a percentage change in an-
other variable (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995).
4The AGA only includes racetrack casinos in Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana and Pennsylva-
nia as part of the commercial casino category, primarily because these four states also had
other forms of commercial casinos in addition to their racetracks.
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Endogenous variable: A variable correlated with a regression model error term. En-
dogenous variables violate an assumption of regression analysis and produce bi-
ased coefficients (Wooldridge, 2006).
Fixed effect: A static difference between one member of a population and the others
(Wooldridge, 2006).
Gross gaming revenue: The amount wagered by players less the winnings returned.
Revenue generated by a casino prior to any taxes, expenses, or promotional al-
lowances (American Gaming Association, 2010).
Real gross state product: The sum of incomes earned by labor and capital and the
costs incurred in the production of goods and services (U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2011).
Instrumental variable: In an equation with an endogenous explanatory variable, a vari-
able that does not appear in the equation, is uncorrelated with the error in the
equation, and is (partially) correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable
(Wooldridge, 2006).
Instrumental variable estimator: An estimator in a linear model used when instru-
mental variables are available for one or more endogenous explanatory variables
(Wooldridge, 2006).
Maximum tax rate: The highest ad valorem tax rate levied on gross gaming revenue.
Where a set of gaming tax rates exist for various games or revenue in a jurisdic-
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tion, the maximum tax rate is defined as the highest value within this set (Ameri-
can Gaming Association, 2010).
Summary
The results of this study will provide an estimate of the change in gaming em-
ployment and wages that arise from a given change in the gaming tax rate. With this
figure, policy makers will be able to use estimates of the economic impact of casinos
to make much more informed decisions of the effects of their tax structures. The gains
in tax revenue from a higher tax rate will be able to be balanced against the losses in
economic impact, and those related economy wide taxes. This will also enable future
researchers to calibrate general equilibrium models, which could compute the econom-
ically efficient or overall tax revenue maximizing tax rates, depending on research ob-
jectives.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This section outlines the relevant literature for this study. First, a review of gen-
eral tax theory is provided, followed by more specific discussion of taxation in the
gaming industry. Discussion of literature relevant to the assumptions of these studies
is then provided, including a review of gamblers economic characteristics within the
political economy.
Tax Theory
Taxes are a necessary part of a well-functioning economy. When imposed cor-
rectly by government, they allow public welfare to increase beyond what would be
available in their absence by providing funding for public goods. First-best taxation
is characterized by lump-sum taxation, which does not distort competitive equilibri-
ums – effectively, it is a transfer of wealth from one party to another that does not af-
fect marginal decision making.1 Under the assumption that government can redistribute
wealth through these lump-sum transfers, the second fundamental theorem of welfare
economics states that any pareto optimal outcome can be reached through transfer pay-
1The perversely phrased ”first-best taxation” is written as such since it is a corollary to
”second-best taxation” without lump-sum transfers.
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ments (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), therefore any initial pareto optimal outcome is accept-
able since all others are possible.
In the absence of an ability to use lump-sum taxes, the optimal commodity tax-
ation structure has been described by Ramsey (1927). In his contribution, Ramsey con-
cludes that if there are no correlations among commodities, that the tax rate should be
inversely proportional to their price elasticities. That is, goods whose demand will re-
spond least to a change in price should be taxed at a higher rate. Where correlations
exist among the demand for goods, the policy prescription becomes more complicated
as the effect of commodity taxes on a given good must be balanced against the change
in demand (and therefore commodity tax revenue) of other complimentary and substitu-
tionary goods.
Given the results of Ramsey (1927), the theoretically correct tax policy in gam-
ing is not clear. Normative policy is complicated by various gaming industries ties to
one another (Philander, 2011; Walker, 2007a) and their ties to the overall tourism in-
dustry (Eadington & Doyle, 2009). For example, since gaming is strongly tied to the
lodging industry, a high tax on gaming may adversely affect tax revenue generated
from hotels. Similarly, a tax on gaming may increase public revenue obtained from the
amusement park industry if the two goods act as substitutes in the larger entertainment
sector.
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that in the absence of (first-best) lump-
sum taxes, governments that require revenue should not tax intermediate goods and
should instead tax final goods (like retail gaming) as this maximizes economic effi-
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ciency. Their study assumes that firms are characterized by constant returns to scale
and zero externalities, which is not applicable in general to the gaming industry (Collins
& Lapsley, 2003; Gu, 2001; Walker, 2007b).2 Therefore, it may be more efficient to tax
gaming suppliers, such as slot manufacturers, if gaming operators have some degree of
market power or are characterized by economies of scale.
In the presence of externalities (a cost or benefit that is incurred by a third party
of a transaction) optimal commodity tax policy is no longer characterized by the condi-
tions described by Ramsey (1927). If consumption of a particular commodity leads to a
negative externality, Pigou (1920) and Baumol (1972) suggest that those goods should
be taxed at a higher rate. In particular, a “pigovian” tax should be equal to the nega-
tive externality, such that the private market is forced to internalize the social cost of
the activity. Higher (pigovian) taxes could therefore be efficient if they are applied to
offset social costs of gaming, such as those noted by Walker (2007b), Collins and Laps-
ley (2003), and Eadington (1996, 2003). As shown in Figure 2, a tax that increases the
market price from P∗ to Pd will reflect the full social cost of the good, and reduce the
2Although many of the specific negative impacts of gambling have been disputed
(both in terms of their magnitude and the relevance), the discussion of the social costs
of gambling, such as by Eadington (1996, 2003), Walker (2007a), Walker (2007b), and
Collins and Lapsley (2003) has included:
• Reduced workforce production
• Health and counseling costs
• Increased policing, judicial system, and insurance costs from higher crime
• Regulatory, research, and evaluation costs
• Social assistance costs
• Loss of life, suffering, stress, and cultural impacts
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Figure 2. A Pigovian tax that increases the market price from P∗ to Pd will reflect the full
social cost of the good, and reduce the quantity consumed from Q∗ to the efficient QT
level. This generates tax revenue equal to the area PDABPS.
quantity consumed from Q∗ to the efficient QT level. This generates tax revenue equal
to the area PDABPS.
In some cases, a tax greater than that described by Baumol (1972) may be ap-
propriate. Tullock (1967) and Sandmo (1975) suggest that higher taxes may be de-
sirable if those sin taxes are able to offset distortive taxes elsewhere in the economy,
such as income taxes that reduce the incentive to work. This phenomenon has been de-
scribed in the environmental economics literature as a double dividend (Pearce, 1991)
since the tax both reduces the harmful externality and offsets distortions elsewhere. The
double dividend is frequently cited as a reason to implement pollution based taxes.
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Gaming Tax Policy
The theoretical discussion above addresses neither the incidence of the tax, nor
the manner in which taxes are applied to the gaming industry. Although the first fun-
damental theorem of welfare economics would suggest that incidence of the tax is not
a concern (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) – and therefore any undesirable regressivity of the
tax structure can be corrected through transfers to low income groups – that theory as-
sumes zero transfer costs in the economy, which is both intuitively unlikely and has
been empirically shown to not be true in gaming (Smith, 1998, 2000). Empirical re-
search in the gaming market has also shown mixed results in terms of earmarking gam-
ing tax revenue (Smith, 1998), making the evidence of gaming tax regressivity (Borg,
Mason, & Shapiro, 1991; Mason, Shapiro, & Borg, 1989; Price & Novak, 1999; Riven-
bark, 1998; Suits, 1977, 1982) unlikely to be reversed through government transfers.3
In Australia, gaming taxes do not appear to follow any sort of pigovian objec-
tive. Chapman et al. (1997) found that the most socially harmful forms of gaming were
not taxed at a higher rate in Australia. Taxes on pokies were fairly low, while the tax
rate on less socially harmful lotteries was comparatively much higher. Similar compara-
tive tax levels are illustrated in the U.S. by Clotfelter (2005).
Smith (1998) has conjectured that the reason for the observed tax levels is that
gaming taxes have been set in order to capture economic rents, rather than to internal-
3The term gaming tax regressivity is used loosely in the literature, without a full
consideration of what proportion of the tax falls to producers. In a monopolistic market
structure, a monopolist would set quantity to maximize economic rents and therefore any
specific excise tax would reduce producer surplus through an effective lump-sum transfer
of economic rents, but not affect consumer surplus.
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ize negative externalities. Walker and Jackson (2008) have also suggested that govern-
ments set gaming tax policy to maximize revenue rather than economic welfare. Ead-
ington (1999a) cited an example where Illinois increased its percentage tax on casino
winnings from 20 percent to 35 percent, in order to capture unforeseen economic rents
that accrued as a result of the lower initial tax level. Chen and Chie (2008) found that
average lottery tax rates were quite similar to the public revenue maximizing estimates
that they produced. The tax revenue maximizing theory is not undisputed. Adam Rose
and Associates (1998) and Meich (2008) suggest that tax rates reflect a joint objective
to both raise public funds and to punish an activity characterized as sinful.
In terms of the decision of whether to implement ad valorem or specific excise
taxes, Paton, Siegel, and Williams (2001) find that ad valorem taxation of net revenue
is an alternative that is at least as efficient as a commodity based tax on gross stakes.
Some jurisdictions, such as Singapore, Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri, have adopted a
two-part tariff tax model where both an admission tax and a tax on gaming revenue is
applied.4 Anderson (2005) has noted that, “In practice, the wagering tax revenue typ-
ically goes to the state, while the admissions tax revenue goes to the casino host local
government...Research is needed to analyze the optimal combination of admission fees
and wagering taxes.” (p.321)
An important distinction of the gaming industry compared to most other “sin”
goods or industries with negative externalities, is that gaming is often introduced as an
export good to other jurisdictions. That is, the home state is able to capture the eco-
4Singapore admission taxes do not apply to foreign visitors.
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nomic rents from foreign state visitors, while exporting many of the negative externali-
ties when the visitors return to their foreign homes. This changes the efficient strategy
of the home state, and may lead to economically efficient proliferation of gaming, be-
yond that which would be prescribed by Pigou (1920). As stated by Eadington (1999a):
Historically, casinos have often been introduced to capture economic bene-
fits from “exporting” casino gaming to customers from regions where the
activity is prohibited. Jurisdictions that legalized casinos were often re-
source poor, or under economic duress. One or both of these factors apply
to Monaco (1863), Nevada (1931), Macao (in the early 20th century), the
Caribbean (1960s), and Atlantic City (1976). (p.186-187)
This exportation strategy may also help explain the emergence of small island nations
– such as Antigua, the Isle of Man, and Alderney – as large suppliers of online gam-
ing licenses and regulation. However, this competitive result may only lead to short-run
economic rents and eventually a long-run oversupply of gaming, as neighboring juris-
dictions seek to legalize gaming to capture some of the economic benefits of gaming
to offset the negative externalities that are being exported to their region. Calcagno,
Walker, and Jackson (2010) have found that a determinant of casino legalization in a
U.S. state is the availability of casino style gaming in a neighboring state.
Problem Gambling Political Economy
There are many different ways to classify gamblers for policy making, but a
common delineation that is made is between problem gamblers and non-problem gam-
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blers (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In terms of their economic character-
istics, there is evidence that these two groups exhibit different behavior in response to
direct measures of price and their demand’s sensitivity to gaming amenities. In their
1999 report, The Australian Productivity Commission 1999 modeled problem gamblers
as having a more inelastic demand curve than non-problem gamblers, reflecting a lower
sensitivity to price changes. A similar view on the reduced sensitivity of problem gam-
blers to price has been expressed by several authors, including Clarke (2008), Paldam
(2008), Quiggin (2000); and Forrest (2008).
Since tax policy is often used as an instrument to regulate the gaming industry,
examining how taxes affect each of these groups – either directly, or indirectly through
an increase in gaming operators’ costs – seems to be an important policy consideration.
The potential for policy decisions that lead to the opposite of the intended outcomes is
noted by Forrest (2010):
Advocates of restrictive regulation have proposed that high prices should be
retained in a gambling market in order not to encourage over-consumption
by existing and potential problem gamblers. For this to be an effective pol-
icy, it would have to be the case that any fall in price would raise losses
among dysfunctional players. Whether or not this or the contrary occurs
depends on whether demand from this pool of players is ’elastic’ or ’inelas-
tic’. Inherent problems exist in designing an experiment to settle this issue
and, to date, no relevant scientific evidence is available. (p.15)
Similar concern has been expressed by Smith (2000):
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Taxation is also perhaps an overly blunt instrument for achieving the social
goals of gambling policy. Regulation may be more effective at restricting
gambling and limiting the harmful effects of problem gambling than higher
tax rates. Because excessive gambling impacts on a gamblers family and
friends, high gambling taxes may worsen financial difficulties for problem
gamblers, and add to the difficulties of children and spouses financially de-
pendent on heavy gamblers. That is, prohibitively high rates or ’user pays’
taxes on gambling may produce more gambling problems than they prevent.
(p.136)
These authors’ suppositions suggest that treating tax policy in the gaming industry in a
manner similar to the way it is treated in other industries may not be appropriate. Put
simply, an excise tax with a pigovian design may disproportionally discourage recre-
ational gamblers over problem gamblers, and therefore not cause problem gamblers to
fully internalize the social costs of their behavior.
There is evidence that gamblers are unable to perceive changes in the payback
percentage of slot machines while at slot machines (Lucas & Singh, 2011; Weatherly
& Brandt, 2004), which may alleviate some undesirable distortions from higher tax in-
duced par values – that is, problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers would respond
in a similar way to an increase in price. However, this does not imply that gamblers are
insensitive to other factors that are influenced by the cost structure of gaming establish-
ments. Differences could include advertisements (Derevensky, Sklar, Gupta, & Messer-
lian, 2010; Monaghan, Derevensky, & Sklar, 2008), casino assets/amenities (Lucas &
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Kilby, 2008; Lucas & Santos, 2003; Suh & Lucas, 2011), and non-experience based
price indicators, such as par values that can be retrieved from gaming commissions.
Many price changes can also be clearly observed at table games, such as rules changes
in blackjack or the addition of a second ’0’ on roulette wheels (Eadington, 1999a). For
high-end players, sensitivity to price is especially transparent, as noted by Eadington
(1999a):
Casinos compete most significantly over internal policies like maximum
limits that such top-end players are permitted to wager, credit facilities, ad-
vanced deposit requirements, and the handling of cash. Moreover, casinos
often provide discounts to these customers by offering rebates on losses and
commissions paid on handle. (p.180)
Problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers may respond in a different manner
to any or all of the factors influenced by gaming establishments’ cost structures. Finlay,
Marmurek, and Londerville (2007) found that problem gamblers were significantly less
sensitive to environmental pleasure than non-problem gamblers, and therefore may be
more likely to gamble more in lower quality casino environments. Hewig et al. (2010)
found that problem gamblers are more likely to make within game decisions that have a
higher house advantage than non-problem gamblers, displaying more risk-loving behav-
ior.
The discussion above is not intended to convince the reader that problem gam-
blers are much less sensitive to price and amenities. Indeed some scholars have postu-
lated that the experience of problem gamblers would make them more sensitive to price
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(Weatherly & Brandt, 2004); but the importance of considering this issue during the
creation of a broad tax policy is high, given the plausibility that current policies are not
targeting those consumers whom they were intended for.
Rational Addiction
Becker and Murphy (1988) make an interesting contribution with applications to
the gaming tax literature in their discussion of a model of rational addiction. In their
article, Becker and Murphy use a neoclassical framework to make predictions about
rational agents behavior in regards to consuming addictive goods. The authors define
their model as a consumer utility maximization problem with a numeraire good y, an
addictive good c, and a level of addiction s. The consumer is forward looking, and
therefore maximizes his utility over a (generally infinite in the article) timeline, sub-
ject to a budget constraint and another equation showing the rate of change in the stock
level of addition over time – an increase in the past consumption of an addictive good
will increase the utility obtained from the same good at present. Preference for goods
are defined idiosyncratically such that they may be addictive to some people, but not
others. 5
A particularly interesting prediction of their model is that consumption can ei-
ther be defined by steady or unsteady states, depending on the nature of preferences
and the stock of assets and addiction. Becker and Murphy use the term “adjacent com-
5Becker and Murphy are quick to note that addiction as defined by their model design
is not confined to detrimental activities such as drug use, alcohol abuse, or pathological
gambling, but also healthy activities.
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plementarity” to describe the case where a consumer will continue to consumer more
of the addictive good if below the steady state equilibrium, and less if above. This idea
is relatively straightforward to conceptualize if one thinks about a very mildly addictive
good (such as gambling for most of the public), where the concave nature of the util-
ity curve (characterized by diminishing marginal utility from consumption of any good
including gambling), will not lead to unstable binges or a quick “cold-turkey” end to
consumption.
Becker and Murphy describe the other potential consumption pattern as unsta-
ble. In this case, the forward looking consumer either binges on the good, consuming
an increasing amount as time tends to infinity, or continues to reduce consumption un-
til he no longer consumes any more of the good. Figure 3 illustrates the two potential
scenarios. At s∗1, consumption is stable at level c∗1 and any exogenous deviation from
this point will be corrected by a move back towards it. The other inflection point is at
coordinate (c∗0,s∗0), where stock levels of addiction below this point lead to cessation
of consumption and levels above this point will lead to continued increased consump-
tion. The authors describe this space above (c∗0,s∗0) as a conceptualization of tolerance
phenomenon of addictive goods, characterized by the continual need to increase con-
sumption in order to satisfy the same need this is a behavior that is commonly used
to diagnose problem/pathological gambling (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
It should be noted that the model predicts that the more addictive a good is, the more
likely the case will be that there is an unstable steady state.
The presence of this inflection point outcome is interesting from a tax policy
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perspective. If we assume that the market for gaming is perfectly competitive, an excise
tax would be fully passed on to consumers. This increase in the consumer price would
lead to coordinate (c∗0,s∗0) moving up, and would cause the group of consumers that
were above the old inflection point but below the new point to discontinue consumption
instead of “binging” to infinity. However, if the market is monopolistic, the results are
not as clear. If a non-ad valorem tax structure is used – in particular, if a specific tax
is used – firms will have no incentive to change their price or quantity supplied, since
they will remain at the profit maximizing equilibrium. Although fully specific gaming
taxes are rare, quasi-specific taxes such as licensing fees (per table, gaming device, or
casino) are often used, and therefore may make poorer policy instruments for reducing
harm than ad valorem taxes.6
6Of course, tax structure is not the only policy tool available for the control of the
health issues and negative externalities that arise from casino gambling.
24
Figure 3. The Becker-Murphy Consumption Model illustrates two potential scenarios. At
S∗1, consumption is stable at level C∗1 and any deviation from this point will be corrected
by a move back towards it. The other inflection point is at coordinate (C∗0,S∗0), where
stock levels of addiction below this point lead to cessation of consumption and levels
above this point will lead to continued increased consumption. Adapted from “A Theory
of Rational Addiction,” by G.S. Becker and K.M. Murphy, 1988, Journal of Political
Economy, 96, p.681.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The following section outlines the methodology used to complete this study.
First, a justification of the secondary data analysis method is provided, followed by a
description of the empirical estimation techniques. Then, an overview of the specific
estimated models is provided, along with a description of the estimation data.
Methodological Justification
In order to estimate the effect of gaming tax rates on casino development, a sec-
ondary panel data analysis method is used. Secondary data is preferable to primary data
in this case since the reliability and validity of self-report gambling behavior has not
been well established for periods of several years, which would be necessary to account
for infrequent changes in tax rates (Hodgins & Makarchuk, 2003; Volberg, Gerstein,
Christiansen, & Baldridge, 2001). Similarly, to use a difference in difference type nat-
ural experiment method along with a firm survey would require sufficient changes in
the tax rate, which occurs infrequently in the market. List-wise deletion will be used to
missing data fields, which will lead to an unbalanced panel.
Accordingly, time series data on the 13 states that offer commercial casino gam-
ing was obtained from the American Gaming Association (AGA) for the period from
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1998 to 2009, to form a panel data set (American Gaming Association, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) – this data consists of
a census of all commercial casinos in the U.S., including their employment and wage
figures. Both effective gaming tax rates (gaming tax revenue divided by gross gaming
win) and maximum gaming tax rates are examined as explanatory variables. Effective
tax rates are appealing since they exhibit the average tax rate paid, and maximum tax
rates are appealing since they tend to indicate the marginal tax paid by the largest op-
erators. An additional binary variable indicating whether the jurisdiction has an admis-
sion tax (i.e. riverboat entry fee) is included as part of the analysis, giving this study
three different measures of casino taxation.
Employment and wages are both proposed as proxy variables of economic devel-
opment. Employment and wages (income) are commonly used as variables to measure
in economic impacts (Daley, Ehrlich, Landefeld, & Barker, 1997; Lynch, 2000; Weis-
brod & Weisbrod, 1997), and may be a better response variable to changes in tax rates
than, say, capital expenditures since they can be more readily adjusted by operators. Al-
though capital investment is an alluring dependent variable because it reflects operators
investments decisions, this variable tends to be relatively static since casino investments
can take periods of several years to buy or sell. This will likely lead to insufficient vari-
ation in the data to reveal statistically robust findings, and will likely lead to Type II
errors. Capital investment measures such as property, plant, and equipment may also
excessively reflect accounting based measures of value (e.g. annual decreases due to
depreciation/amortization) and will therefore bias estimates of the true economic value.
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Christiansen (2005) found similar trends when comparing tax rates to capital invest-
ment and casino employment, further validating the use of employment as a dependent
variable that will capture the general economic impacts. As socioeconomic control vari-
ables, state level income and labor data have been obtained from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, while population and unemployment data have been obtained from the
U.S. Census Bureau.
To analyze the compiled secondary database, a fixed effects panel model design
with two-stage least squares is used. Secondary data analysis creates difficulty in at-
tributing causality, since producing consistent coefficient estimates requires eliminating
the omitted variable bias. Previous analysis on this casino tax research topic, such as
that done by Christiansen (2005) and Thompson (2011), likely suffered from endoge-
nous cross-section correlational, and therefore may reflect non-causal relationships and
biased estimates. In this type of analysis, the presence of different gaming policy re-
strictions and different market structures in each state creates measurement issues if a
non-robust model is used. In particular, if a multiple linear regression (OLS) model was
used that failed to account for those unobserved terms, a inconsistent estimate would be
made that would compromise the findings of the study (Wooldridge, 2010).
Fixed effects models are commonly used in panel data sets when there is an
immeasurable unobserved effect in each section, in order to alleviate omitted variable
issues. This method alone does not ensure an unbiased estimate – if there are non-
constant omitted variables within the model that are correlated with the variable of in-
terest (gaming tax rate) the study estimates may be biased – but it greatly improves the
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reliability of the analysis over a pooled estimation procedure. In order to account for
other potential endogeneity in the wage term, this study also implements a two-stage
least squares instrumental variable approach.
Since there may be non-constant factors in the model error term that affect both
the gaming tax and casino employment (e.g. tribal gaming, political environment, or
a change in commercial gaming licenses), ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates may
produce biased coefficient estimates. The two-stage least squares estimator consistently
estimates the wage regression parameter by using an instrument to purge out the cor-
relation between the explanatory variable and the model error term. Two-stage least
squares estimation produces a consistent coefficient estimate through the use of an ex-
ogenous instrumental variable (Wooldridge, 2006).
In this study, two instruments are proposed for the endogenous gaming tax vari-
able. The first instrument is the total state wide tax revenue as a percentage of state
GDP. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is a common statistic used to measure the
overall jurisdictional design of compulsory transfers to the state, e.g. OECD (2011).
The second instrument is the total state wide alcohol tax revenue, as a percentage of
state GDP. This second variable is similar to the first, but focuses on revenue from an-
other specific sin tax.
In instrumental variable estimation, two necessary conditions need to be satis-
fied by valid instruments. The first condition is a correlation of zero between the in-
strument and the structural model error term. In this model, that would be character-
ized by Cov(StateTaxRateit ,uit) = 0 and Cov(AlcoholTaxRateit ,uit) = 0. Second, it
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must be the case that the instrument and the endogenous variable be correlated, i.e.
Cov(StateTaxRateit ,GamingTaxRateit) 6= 0 and Cov(AlcoholTaxRateit ,GamingTaxRateit) 6=
0.
Theoretically, it seems intuitively plausible that the overall state-wide tax rate
will not provide any additional explanatory power to gaming employment beyond what
is already addressed by the model through the gross gaming revenue tax, the other con-
trol variables, and the fixed effects variables. For example, if the presence of a partic-
ularly pronounced recession in a single state causes both the gaming tax and the state-
wide tax to change simultaneously, the economic control variables such as real GDP
or the unemployment rate will likely capture this variation in the structural regression
model. With regards to the alcohol tax rate variable, this seems even more likely to sat-
isfy the first necessary condition of valid instruments. The variable focuses on a tax at-
tributable to another industry and should not have a direct effect on casino employment.
In addition to these theoretical arguments, an empirical Hansen J overidentification test
(Hansen, 1982) will be conducted on the data to support the validity of these variables
as instruments.
The second condition of a non-zero correlation between the gaming tax and
state-wide tax has not been established empirically in the literature, however Furlong
(1998) did find that tax collections contributed to casino adoption at the state level.
Calcagno et al. (2010) also found that other fiscal variables affected casino policy adop-
tion. With regards to the alcohol tax rate, it seems plausible that states that choose to
heavily tax one sin good will also heavily tax other legal sin goods, so a positive rela-
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tionship is expected between these variables. To reduce any theoretical concerns about
the satisfaction of the Cov(StateTaxRateit , GamingTaxRateit) 6= 0 and Cov(AlcoholTaxRateit ,
GamingTaxRateit) 6= 0 assumption, empirical tests will also be conducted for the vari-
ables’ signifance in predicting the gaming tax rate variable and the overall F-test of
weak identification value (Staiger & Stock, 1997).
Model Design
In this section, the set of equations describing this study’s estimation model is
provided, along with a description of the various secondary data sources used to esti-
mate the model coefficients.
First, consider linear Equation 1 defining the underlying relationship between
economic output and gaming taxes:
yit = α0 +β1 · Taxit + xit ·λ +dt ·δ + vi +uit (1)
Where,
yit is the indicator of casino gaming development, including:
– Casino Employees (American Gaming Association, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
– Casino Wages (American Gaming Association, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
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α0 is the model constant
Taxit is the primary variable of interest, including:
– Maximum gaming tax (American Gaming Association, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
– Effective gaming tax (American Gaming Association, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
β1 is the gaming tax coefficient
xit is a vector of factors that affect gaming development that vary by state and year,
including:
– Real gross state product (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011)
– Real personal income per capita (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011)
– Unemployment rate (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011)
– Population size (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011)
– Gaming availability proxied by number of instate commercial casinos (Amer-
ican Gaming Association, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
– Productivity proxied by gross gaming revenue per employee (American
Gaming Association, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
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– A binary variable indicating the presence of an admission tax (American
Gaming Association, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
λ are the slope regression coefficients for xit
dt is a vector of non-state specific factors that affect gaming development and vary
by year, including:
– The AGA measures of national gaming acceptability (American Gaming
Association, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010)
– Other variables proxied by binary year variables
δ are the coefficients for non-state specific factors that affect gaming development
and vary by year
vi are state specific constant factors that affect gaming development
uit is the model error term
Since the available data outlined in the bulleted sections above may not fully
specify Equation 1, the model may produce a biased estimate of β1. That is, it may
be the case that missing variables included in the model error term, uit , are correlated
with our variable of interest (i.e. Cov(Taxit ,uit) 6= 0). The proposed remedies to this
methodological issue are outlined below.
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Fixed Effects
If the mean of Equation 1 is taken over time and subtract it from itself, we have:
yit −yi = α0−α0 +β1 · (Taxit −Taxi)+(xit −xi) ·λ +(dt −d) ·δ +vi−vi +uit −ui (2)
or alternatively,
y¨it = β1 · ¨Taxit + x¨it ·λ + d¨t ·δ + u¨it (3)
Where the umlauts denote the time-demeaned values, but note that the coefficients re-
main the same for our variable of interest, and our other non-static variables. This fixed
effects estimation method removes the need to specify a model with the state specific
constant factors that affect gaming development. This reduces bias in our model from
state specific factors that are difficult to control through proxy variables.
Two-Stage Least Squares
Since there may be other non-static variables that affect our two dependent vari-
ables (real casino wages and employment), we still may not have a fully specified model.
If it is the case that those omitted variables now contained in u¨it are correlated with
our tax variables of interest, we will still be violating the assumption of ordinary least
squares whereby Cov( ¨Taxit , u¨it) 6= 0. That is, our estimates of β1 will suffer from the
classic endogeneity problem, even with the fixed effects included in the model design.
As a remedy for this potential bias, we specify the following reduced form (first stage)
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equation to obtain exogenous estimates of ¨Taxit , ˆTaxit .
ˆTaxit = x¨it ·pi + d¨t ·ω +β2 · zit +µit (4)
In this equation, zit denotes our instruments, effective statewide tax revenue per gross
state product (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2011; U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2011) and effective alcohol tax revenue per gross state product (Institute &
Institution, n.d.; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011), which must satisfy the con-
ditions previously described.
The fitted values from this first stage model are then used to replace the poten-
tially endogenous wage variable in the second stage model. The second stage (struc-
tural) model equation is then:
y¨it = βˆ1 · ˆTaxit + x¨it ·λ + d¨t ·δ + vi + u¨it (5)
Which produces the now consistent estimator, βˆ1.
12
1The estimation procedure used by statistical packages differs somewhat from this
explanation, but the logic for using an instrument to obtain a consistent instrumental
variable for our endogenous variable of interest remains the same.
2For a proof that βˆ1 = β1 see Wooldridge (2010).
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Summary
This section provided an overview of the method used to analyze the effect of
casino taxes on employment and wages. The data used to complete this study is noted
to come from an annual census conducted by the American Gaming Association of all
U.S. commercial casinos. To supplement this gaming data, socio-economic control vari-
ables are extracted from various government databases. As a remedy for likely missing
data to fully specify Equation 1, this study uses a fixed effects two stage least squares
regression analysis to correct for potential endogeneity in the casino tax variables.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The following chapter outlines the empirical results of the study. First, an overview
of the data used in the analysis is provided, followed by an estimation of equation 5
from Chapter 3, including several tests of the assumptions of two-stage least squares.
Then, to ensure the robustness of the results, several other related models are estimated.
These include random-effect models, regression-adjusted models, alternate instrumental
variables, a log-linear model, and various subsets of the data. Finally, alternate forms of
the dependent variable and the variable of interest are estimated. The chapter concludes
with an overview of the general results from the empirical analysis.
Data Overview
As discussed in Chapter 3, the empirical analysis makes use of data amalga-
mated from several sources. This section includes an overview of the data’s summary
statistics and includes plots of key variables over time.
Summary statistics of the non-binary variables are provided in Table 1. As shown
in the table, all non-binary variables are transformed by the natural logarithm (Log).
Changes in the natural logarithm approximate percentage changes, therefore coefficients
in future regression models from this chapter can be interpreted as elasticities. The nat-
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ural log function is negative for values less than one and positive for values over one;
the function is undefined for values equal to or less than zero.
Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Log of Employees 9.52 1.22 5.63 12.28 136
Log of Real Income per Capita 10.39 0.14 10.04 10.72 137
Log of Maximum GGR Tax Rate 2.87 0.61 1.83 4.25 136
Log of Effective GGR Tax Rate -1.72 0.55 -2.69 -0.63 136
Log of Alcohol Tax Revenue per GDP -8.27 0.51 -9.12 -6.96 137
Log of All Tax Revenue per GDP -2.97 0.19 -3.36 -2.59 137
Log of Number of Commercial Casinos 2.87 1.16 0 5.61 137
Log of Average GGR per Casino 4.43 1.53 -0.46 6.22 136
Log of Population 15.32 0.77 13.5 16.37 137
Log of Real Income per Capita 10.39 0.14 10.04 10.72 137
Log of Unemployment Rate 1.6 0.32 0.96 2.59 137
Figure 4 highlights all states with commercial gaming in 1998 (the first year
of this study’s data set) and Figure 5 highlights all states with commercial gaming in
2009 (the final year of this study’s data set). As noted in Chapter 3, this study uses an
unbalanced panel, therefore not all states appear in all years of the study.
The primary dependent variable, commercial casino employment, is plotted for
each state (except for Nevada) in Figure 6. No consistent trend is observed in all states.
The primary independent variable of interest, maximum casino tax rate, is plot-
ted for each state in Figure 7. Abrupt changes in the tax rate for different states during
different periods suggests that sufficient variation will be present to observe a signifi-
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Figure 4. States with commercial casinos in 1998 are highlighted in green. Those states
include Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, and South Dakota.
Figure 5. States with commercial casinos in 2009 are highlighted in green. Those states
include Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.
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Figure 6. Commercial casino employment values are plotted by state. Nevada values
are excluded to improve readability of the chart. Where other data points are missing
indicates that there were no legally operating commercial casinos in that period. The
exception to this is the 2006 South Dakota value where no estimates were available from
American Gaming Association (2007).
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Figure 7. Commercial casino maximum tax rates are plotted by state. Where data points
are missing indicates that there were no legally operating commercial casinos in that
period.
cant coefficient from these natural experiments.
Fully Specified Empirical Model
The following section describes the results from the fully specified empirical
model.
41
First Stage Model
The first stage results of the fully specified empirical model are provided in Ta-
ble 2. The model, which produces the instrumental variable for the natural logarithm
of the maximum tax rate on gross gaming revenue, appears to fit the data well. Both
instruments, the natural logarithm of alcohol tax revenue per unit of state domestic
product (Log Alcohol Tax) and the natural logarithm of all state tax revenue per unit
of state domestic product (Log All Tax), have positive and statistically significant coef-
ficients; z(114) = 2.75, p = .007 and z(115) = 2.35, p = .021, respectively. This finding
supports the second necessary condition for the instruments, Cov(AlcoholTaxRateit ,GamingTaxRateit) 6=
0 and Cov(StateTaxRateit ,GamingTaxRateit) 6= 0. To further establish the validity of
the instruments, additional statistical tests were conducted and are provided in Table 3.
The F-test of weak identification=12.15, exceeded the benchmark value of 10, suggest-
ing that these variables adequately satisfied the second necessary condition of strong
instruments (Sovey & Green, 2011; Staiger & Stock, 1997). The Hansen J statistic,
HJ = 0.67, p = 0.415 (also known as the overidentification test), failed to reject the as-
sumption that Log Alcohol Tax and Log All Tax do not belong in the structural model.
This finding supports the first necessary condition of valid instruments.
Second Stage Structural Model
The structural model produced results that were generally in line with theo-
retical suppositions. The elasticity of casino employment with respect to the maxi-
mum gaming tax rate is estimated to be ε = −0.46, and is statistically significant,
z(115) = −2.55, p = .011. This suggests that a 1% increase in the maximum tax rate
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Table 2
First-Stage Model
Log of Maximum GGR Tax Rate
b se z p
Log of Alcohol Tax Revenue per GDP 0.26*** 0.09 2.75 0.01
Log of All Tax Revenue per GDP 0.75** 0.32 2.35 0.02
Log of Number of Commercial Casinos 0.07 0.09 0.79 0.43
Log of Population -0.47* 0.24 -1.91 0.06
Log of Average GGR per Casino 0.11 0.09 1.21 0.23
Log of Real Income per Capita -1.15** 0.44 -2.60 0.01
Log of Unemployment Rate 0.10 0.09 1.07 0.29
1999 0.09 0.06 1.61 0.11
2000 0.12* 0.07 1.89 0.06
2001 0.14* 0.08 1.67 0.10
2002 0.21*** 0.08 2.77 0.01
2003 0.30*** 0.09 3.34 0.00
2004 0.36*** 0.10 3.70 0.00
2005 0.32*** 0.09 3.49 0.00
2006 0.35*** 0.09 3.91 0.00
2007 0.36*** 0.09 3.84 0.00
2008 0.37*** 0.10 3.52 0.00
2009 0.34** 0.13 2.61 0.01
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors provided.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3
Tests of IV Assumptions
IVs: Log Alcohol Tax/GDP & Log All Tax/GDP
Observations 133
F-test of weak identification 12.15
Hansen J statistic 0.66
Hansen J p-stat 0.41
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would reduce casino employment by 0.46%.
Findings from other gaming related variables appeared to be reasonable. The
gaming availability variable (log of number of commercial casinos) produced a rea-
sonably inelastic coefficient (0.66), and the productivity variable (log of average GGR
per casino) also produced an inelastic estimate (0.38). The findings support the asser-
tion that U.S. casinos may be subject to economies of scale in labor. A doubling of the
gaming revenue per casino would only increase employment by an estimated 38%. In-
deed, Gu (2001) has previously provided evidence that casino operations are subject
to economies of scale in payroll and other expenses, and this additionally validates the
wave of operator consolidation in the U.S. gaming industry that occurred during the
late 20th century and early 21st century.
The population variable produced a significant and positive elasticity coeffi-
cient (0.60), which suggests a positive relationship between total population growth
and growth in short-run casino development. The two economic variables, log of real
income per capita and log of the unemployment rate, failed to produce a significant co-
efficient. This may be the result of these variables indirectly affecting the employment
level through the average GGR variable. That is, higher income and employment lev-
els will lead to increased spending on casino gaming, thereby increasing employment
through the average GGR variable.
Additional variables were tested for significance as part of the empirical anal-
ysis, but were omitted from the results due to high collinearity with the fixed-effects
and the other explanatory variables. These excluded variables included the AGA mea-
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Table 4
Full Model Specification
Log of Employees
b se z p
Log of Maximum GGR Tax Rate -0.46** 0.18 -2.55 0.01
Log of Number of Commercial Casinos 0.66*** 0.09 7.22 0.00
Log of Average GGR per Casino 0.38*** 0.08 4.75 0.00
Log of Population 0.60** 0.24 2.55 0.01
Log of Real Income per Capita 0.25 0.47 0.53 0.60
Log of Unemployment Rate 0.11 0.08 1.41 0.16
1999 0.07 0.06 1.11 0.27
2000 0.03 0.07 0.51 0.61
2001 -0.03 0.07 -0.43 0.67
2002 -0.06 0.08 -0.69 0.49
2003 -0.06 0.10 -0.60 0.55
2004 -0.07 0.11 -0.59 0.56
2005 -0.10 0.11 -0.88 0.38
2006 -0.11 0.12 -0.98 0.33
2007 -0.13 0.12 -1.02 0.31
2008 -0.11 0.14 -0.82 0.41
2009 -0.20 0.15 -1.28 0.20
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are provided.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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sures of national gaming acceptability, the admission tax binary variable, real gross
state product, and alternative transformations of all variables.
Tests of Assumptions
Having fit the structural model outlined in Chapter 3, select model assumptions
are further analyzed for efficiency and validation in this section.
Hausman Test
A Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978), measuring whether the fixed-
effect is misspecified, is estimated and shown in Table 5. The Hausman test failed
to show a statistically significant difference between the estimates in the fixed effect
model, and the random effect model, Chi2(17) = 15.74, p = .542.1. As the Hausman
test failed to reveal a difference between the fixed-effect and the random-effect model,
an instrumental variable model without fixed-effects, but that allows for standard error
correlation within states, is provided in Table 6. The model fails to produce statistically
significant values for the instruments in the first-stage, and also has an F-test of weak
identification well below the required threshold of 10 (F = 1.08). Therefore, subsequent
models in this section reject the non-fixed effect specifications, despite some concern
from the Hausman test of a possible loss of efficiency. The fixed-effect model remains
a consistent estimator, therefore the results should be asymptotically identical.
1Note that the Hausman model was estimated without the use of instruments
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Table 5
Hausman Specification Test
Fixed Effects Random Effects
Log of Maximum GGR Tax Rate -0.46 (0.18)** -0.86 (0.24)***
Log of Number of Commercial Casinos 0.66 (0.08)*** 0.92 (0.04)***
Log of Average GGR per Casino 0.38 (0.06)*** 0.68 (0.07)***
Log of Population 0.60 (0.27)** 0.51 (0.32)
Log of Real Income per Capita 0.25 (0.53) -1.32 (0.84)
Log of Unemployment Rate 0.11 (0.10) -0.30 (0.33)
1999 0.07 (0.05) 0.06 (0.12)
2000 0.03 (0.06) 0.03 (0.13)
2001 -0.03 (0.08) 0.07 (0.16)
2002 -0.06 (0.09) 0.14 (0.22)
2003 -0.06 (0.11) 0.21 (0.25)
2004 -0.07 (0.12) 0.23 (0.26)
2005 -0.10 (0.12) 0.20 (0.26)
2006 -0.11 (0.13) 0.17 (0.24)
2007 -0.13 (0.13) 0.15 (0.23)
2008 -0.11 (0.15) 0.26 (0.29)
2009 -0.20 (0.17) 0.52 (0.42)
Constant -4.68 (7.85) 12.48 (5.26)**
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors provided in parentheses.
chi2(17) = 15.74, p-stat = 0.5423
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Normality Tests
Table 7 provides the Skewness/Kurtosis (SK), Shapiro-Wilk W, and Shapiro-
Francia W tests of the normality of the distribution of the full model residuals. Al-
though these tests provide different results when using a .05α rejection criteria, Gould
and Rogers (1991) suggest that the SK tests for normality are preferred over Shapiro-
Wilk W or Shapiro-Francia W tests when aggregated data is used. As this study does
not use firm level data, but instead uses data aggregated by state, the SK test appears
to be the preferred metric to validate the normality of the distribution of the residuals.
The SK test fails to reject the assumption of normality at the .05α level, Chi2(2) =
4.82,(Joint)p = .09, and therefore proceed on the assumption that this requirement
is satisfied. The histrogram plot provided in Figure 8 also appears to reasonably bell
shaped and fit a normal distribution, further supporting this assumption.
Table 7
Normality Tests
Full Model Specification
Skewness/Kurtosis Pr(skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) Adj. Chi2(2) (Joint) p
0.068 0.228 4.82 0.090
Shapiro-Wilk W W V z p
0.977 2.439 2.008 0.022
Shapiro-Francia W W V z p
0.977 2.595 1.943 0.026
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Figure 8. The histogram of the full model residuals do not appear to show any significant
departures from normality.
Serial Correlation
Since an unbalanced panel is used in this study, conventional time-series tests
like Breusch-Godfrey or Durbin-Watson are not available to test the assumption of
uncorrelated error terms (over time). Similarly, the use of a simultaneously estimated
instrumental variable method inhibited the ability to use a regression based approach
to test the lag of model residuals for significance. To address this possible inference
issue, several regression-adjusted models were estimated with Parzen kernel estima-
tors that are robust to the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and one period se-
rial correlation (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007). Table 8 compares these t-stats to
the Eicker/Huber/White/sandwich heteroskedasticity robust estimators (Baum et al.,
50
2007) that appear in other models of this study, for several regression-adjusted mod-
els. In general, only minor differences appear in the magnitude of the t-stats, and the
differences do not cause a change in the interpretation of hypotheses tests for any of
the variables of interest.
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Regression-Adjusted Models
In order to ensure that the results were robust to the particular selection of the
instruments, alternative models were specified using modified instruments. Three of
these models’ results are provided in Table 9 and Table 10. Model (1) uses an alter-
native measure of alcohol taxes, total revenue per income per capita, while models (2)
and (3) use only a single instrument from the full model.2 The regression coefficients
in the structural models (Table 10) are reasonably robust to the instrumental variable
used.
The robustness of the coefficient estimates were further validated by estimat-
ing various regression-adjusted models. Table 11 includes several of these regression-
adjusted structural (second-stage) models alongside the fully specified model results
that is labeled as model (8). A few noteworthy results arise. First, the inclusion of sim-
ple year dummy variables ensures that the coefficient on the variable of interest (Log of
Maximum GGR Tax Rate) is statistically signficant, negative in direction, and inelas-
tic. Second, the addition of Average GGR per Casino leads to a loss of significance on
the Unemployment Rate variable. This may indicate that the effect of the economy on
casino employment is indirectly occurring through the change in gross gaming revenue.
The change in the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) further supports this assertion,
as this value increases (decreases in absolute value) from model (7) to (8), despite the
addition of a statistically significant population variable.
2Tobacco taxes was also tested as a potential instrument, but was excluded as it ap-
peared to be a weak instrument.
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Table 9
Alternate IV Specification: First-Stage Models
Log of Maximum GGR Tax Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Log of Alcohol Tax Rev. per Inc. per Cap. 0.24 (0.09)***
Log of Alcohol Tax Revenue per GDP 0.34 (0.08)***
Log of All Tax Revenue per GDP 0.80 (0.31)** 0.92 (0.29)***
Log of Number of Commercial Casinos 0.08 (0.09) 0.08 (0.07) 0.09 (0.09)
Log of Average GGR per Casino 0.10 (0.09) 0.04 (0.06) 0.12 (0.10)
Log of Population -0.42 (0.25)* -0.77 (0.17)*** -0.10 (0.23)
Log of Real Income per Capita -1.13 (0.46)** -1.03 (0.43)** -1.40 (0.44)***
Log of Unemployment Rate 0.11 (0.09) 0.02 (0.10) 0.10 (0.09)
1999 0.09 (0.06) 0.10 (0.06) 0.08 (0.06)
2000 0.13 (0.07)** 0.14 (0.07)** 0.12 (0.07)*
2001 0.15 (0.08)* 0.18 (0.08)** 0.13 (0.09)
2002 0.22 (0.08)*** 0.23 (0.07)*** 0.21 (0.08)**
2003 0.31 (0.09)*** 0.31 (0.09)*** 0.30 (0.10)***
2004 0.37 (0.10)*** 0.36 (0.10)*** 0.37 (0.11)***
2005 0.33 (0.09)*** 0.35 (0.09)*** 0.31 (0.10)***
2006 0.36 (0.09)*** 0.39 (0.09)*** 0.34 (0.10)***
2007 0.37 (0.09)*** 0.42 (0.09)*** 0.34 (0.10)***
2008 0.37 (0.11)*** 0.44 (0.11)*** 0.34 (0.11)***
2009 0.35 (0.13)*** 0.42 (0.13)*** 0.32 (0.14)**
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors provided in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 10
Alternate IV Specification: Structural Models
Log of Employees
(1) (2) (3)
Log of Maximum GGR Tax Rate -0.46 (0.18)** -0.56 (0.20)*** -0.38 (0.22)*
Log of Number of Commercial Casinos 0.66 (0.09)*** 0.67 (0.10)*** 0.65 (0.09)***
Log of Average GGR per Casino 0.38 (0.08)*** 0.38 (0.09)*** 0.37 (0.07)***
Log of Population 0.60 (0.24)** 0.57 (0.24)** 0.63 (0.24)***
Log of Real Income per Capita 0.24 (0.47) 0.11 (0.50) 0.36 (0.49)
Log of Unemployment Rate 0.11 (0.08) 0.12 (0.09) 0.11 (0.08)
1999 0.07 (0.06) 0.08 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06)
2000 0.03 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07)
2001 -0.03 (0.08) -0.01 (0.08) -0.05 (0.08)
2002 -0.06 (0.09) -0.03 (0.09) -0.08 (0.09)
2003 -0.06 (0.10) -0.03 (0.10) -0.08 (0.11)
2004 -0.06 (0.11) -0.03 (0.12) -0.10 (0.12)
2005 -0.09 (0.11) -0.06 (0.11) -0.12 (0.12)
2006 -0.11 (0.12) -0.07 (0.12) -0.15 (0.13)
2007 -0.12 (0.12) -0.08 (0.13) -0.16 (0.13)
2008 -0.11 (0.14) -0.07 (0.15) -0.15 (0.15)
2009 -0.19 (0.15) -0.15 (0.16) -0.23 (0.16)
F-test of Weak Identification 12.17 18.30 9.70
Hansen J statistic 0.78
Hansen J p-stat 0.38
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors provided in parentheses.
Hansen J statistics do not appear for models (2) and (3) since they are not overidentified
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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There is a remarkable change in the maximum GGR tax rate coefficient, once
average GGR per casino is added to the regression equation. Average GGR per casino
is an imperfect measure of the average casino size (and therefore the number of em-
ployees needed to operate the facilities). The issue is that average GGR is affected
by both supply and demand factors, and therefore may be overcontrolling the model.
It is unclear if the change in the maximum GGR tax rate coefficient is due to a non-
orthogonal relationship with supply side aspects of the casino size proxy variable, or
due to a more well controlled model.
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Reduced Sample Models
In order to ensure that the results were not being excessively driven by an out-
lier state, several reduced sample models were estimated that excluded particular state’s
observations. Table 12 includes several of these reduced sample structural models. In
all but one of the models shown, the variable of interest (Log of Maximum GGR Tax
Rate) is statistically signficant, negative in direction, and inelastic. Given the changes
in the BIC from model (7) to (8) in Table 11, overidentification may be the primary
reason for the loss of signficance on the variable of interest in the ”(8)w/o NV” model.
Regardless of the possible explanation, there is no strong theoretical argument to ex-
clude valid observations from any particular state, and these results generally support
the robustness of the results to state outliers.
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Tribal Model
Since reliable data on the tribal industry was not available for the full duration
of the estimation sample, a reduced sample model is estimated for the years 2005-2009.
This sample is not sufficiently large to produce significant results with an instrumen-
tal variable model, therefore an OLS fixed effect model is estimated. As described in
Chapter 3, the proxy variable for tribal gaming size is the number of tribal casinos in
the state. Table 13 outlines the results of this model, along with the full instrumental
variable model. The tribal casino variable is not significant, and the variable of interest
remains statistically significant, negative, and slightly inelastic. Although this is a rough
comparison given the limited amount of data on tribal gaming, the results are generally
in line with what was found in the other models that exclude tribal gaming but correct
for possible associated endogeneity.
Log-Linear Model
As an alternate means to estimate the robustness of both the estimates and the
tax rate elasticities, a log-linear model is fitted where the dependent variable (employ-
ment) continues to be transformed by the natural logarithm, but the right hand side
variables all appear in level form. As shown in Table 14, the results appear to be fairly
consistent with the log-log model estimations. The F-test of weak identification=10.27,
exceeded the benchmark value of 10, suggesting that these variables adequately sat-
isfied the second necessary condition of strong instruments. The Hansen J statistic,
HJ = 0.28, p = 0.59, failed to reject the assumption that the linear form of alcohol tax
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Table 13
Tribal Comparative Structural Models
Log of Employees
Tribal Model (OLS) Full Model (IV)
Number of State Tribal Casinos 0.01 (0.02)
Log of Maximum GGR Tax Rate -0.99 (0.41)** -0.46 (0.18)**
Log of Number of Commercial Casinos 1.05 (0.33)*** 0.66 (0.09)***
Log of Average GGR per Casino 0.53 (0.18)** 0.38 (0.08)***
Log of Population -0.15 (1.12) 0.60 (0.24)**
Log of Real Income per Capita -0.94 (1.23) 0.25 (0.47)
Log of Unemployment Rate 0.07 (0.13) 0.11 (0.08)
1999 0.07 (0.06)
2000 0.03 (0.07)
2001 -0.03 (0.07)
2002 -0.06 (0.08)
2003 -0.06 (0.10)
2004 -0.07 (0.11)
2005 -0.10 (0.11)
2006 0.01 (0.03) -0.11 (0.12)
2007 0.01 (0.05) -0.13 (0.12)
2008 0.05 (0.09) -0.11 (0.14)
2009 -0.02 (0.14) -0.20 (0.15)
Observations 58 133
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors provided in parentheses.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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revenue per gross state product and all tax revenue per gross state product do not be-
long in the structural model. This finding supports the first necessary condition of valid
instruments.
All of the explanatory variables that were significant in the log-log model are
significant in the log-linear model, with the exception of population. It may be the case
that a linear relationship between the log of employment and population does not ade-
quately capture the true relationship of these variables.
Table 14
Log-Lin Model Specification
Log of Employees
b se z p
Maximum GGR Tax Rate -1.772** 0.721 -2.458 0.014
Number of Commercial Casinos 0.003** 0.001 2.002 0.045
Average GGR per Casino (millions) 0.170*** 0.031 5.458 0.000
Population (millions) 0.123 0.143 0.861 0.389
Real Income per Capita (thousands) 0.004 0.016 0.255 0.799
Unemployment Rate 1.051 1.532 0.686 0.493
1999 0.102 0.081 1.269 0.204
2000 0.114 0.091 1.253 0.210
2001 0.064 0.099 0.648 0.517
2002 0.067 0.111 0.604 0.546
2003 0.091 0.128 0.709 0.479
2004 0.086 0.141 0.609 0.543
2005 0.038 0.136 0.281 0.779
2006 0.009 0.145 0.062 0.951
2007 0.017 0.154 0.114 0.910
2008 0.052 0.163 0.315 0.752
2009 0.001 0.177 0.005 0.996
Observations 133
F-test of weak identification 10.27
Hansen J statistic 0.28
Hansen J p-stat 0.59
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 9. The elasticity of employment with respect to the maximum tax rate is quite
inelastic at the lowest levels of tax rates observed in the sample, and does not reach the
unitary level for even the highest tax rates observed in 2010, Pennsylvania’s 55% rate.
An advantage of the log-linear model specification is that it allows for the com-
putation of non-constant elasticity values. In particular, elasticities of employment can
be computed as a function of the state tax rate, allowing for non-average values to be
estimated, which may be more useful for policy making at the state level. As shown in
Figure 9, the elasticity of employment with respect to the maximum tax rate is quite in-
elastic at the lowest levels of tax rates observed in the sample (e.g. Nevada at a 6.75%
tax rate is estimated to have an elasticity of -0.12). Estimated elasticities do not reach
the unitary level for even the highest tax rates observed in any state in 2010 – Pennsyl-
vania’s 55% rate is estimated to have an elasticity of -0.97.
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Effective Tax Rates
The analysis of effective tax rates as a dependent variable failed to produce a
meaningful and statistically significant relationship between those rates and casino em-
ployment. In part, this may be due to weakness in the instruments. As shown in Ta-
ble 15, none of the models produced F-tests of weak identification with values above
10. Additionally, the Hansen J statistics rejected the null hypothesis in models 4-7. In
none of the models did Log of Effective GGR Tax Rate produce statistically significant
values at the .05α level.
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Wages
The analysis of wages as a dependent variable failed to produce a meaningful
and statistically significant coefficient for the maximum gaming tax rate variable. As
shown in Table 16, only three of the models produced F-tests of weak identification
with values above 10 (models 2, 5, and 7), but none of these produced statistically sig-
nificant coefficients for Log of Effective GGR Tax Rate at the .05α level. Only one of
these three models produced a statistically significant coefficient at the .1α level (model
6). In that model, the Hansen J statistic produced a p-value that sat at the rejection cri-
terion, HJ = 3.78, p = 0.05, and the F-test of weak identification=8.16 was below the
required threshold of 10. That model did produce elasticity estimates that were similar
in magnitude to the estimates with employment as a dependent variable, i.e. negative
and inelastic.
Since total wages is simply the product of employment and the average wage, a
significant finding with respect to employment but a lack of a significant finding with
respect to wages suggests one of three explanations (or a combination thereof). The
first possible cause is poor data quality. A higher variance in the wage data from poor
survey reliability (as compared to the employment data) would increase the likelihood
of returning a Type II error. However, it seems unlikely that the wage data would be
of poorer quality than the employment data since they are both obtained from the same
source (American Gaming Association, 2010), and the surveyed firms are highly reg-
ulated casinos with strong accounting controls. The second possible cause is that the
average wage responds in the opposite direction to the change in employment, thereby
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abating the effect of taxes on total wages. There is general evidence of wage stickiness
in the economy as a whole, e.g. Keynes (1939) or Solow (1979), suggesting that any
such movement would be moderate and more likely to occur as a wage increase that is
paired with a decrease in total employment, rather than a wage decrease paired with an
increase in total employment. The third possible explanation is a poor empirical model.
For example, the validity of instruments in Table 11 tends to be generally more robust
than in Table 16, as the former’s Hansen J statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis
in any model specification shown. Further discussion of this observation is provided in
Chapter 5.
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Summary
This section described the empirical results of tests related to the research ques-
tions stated in Chapter 1. In general, a robust, negative, and inelastic relationship was
found between the maximum gross gaming revenue tax and commercial casino em-
ployment. Depending on the precise model specification, the constant elasticity models
produced estimates ranging from roughly -0.4 to -0.9. The gaming availability variable
(log of number of commercial casinos) and the productivity variable (log of average
GGR per casino) generally produced inelastic estimates (roughly 0.7 and 0.4 respec-
tively), supporting the assertion that U.S. casinos are characterized by economies of
scale in labor.
No relationship was estimated between the presence of an admission tax and
employment, since there was insufficient variation in this tax variable to capture an ef-
fect size. No robust relationship was found between the effective tax rate and commer-
cial casino employment, suggesting that the maximum tax rate reasonably captures the
marginal tax rate used for decision making by operators, but effective tax rates do not
at the state aggregation level. No robust relationship was found between total wages
and the maximum tax rate. This result is likely attributable to a Type II error due to
poor data quality, a positive relationship between the average wage and the tax rate,
and/or poor empirical modeling.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In jurisdictions around the World, legal casino style gaming is viewed as both
an economic catalyst and public revenue generator (Eadington, 1999a). After observing
many different market structures for the provision of casino gaming, this study provided
some evidence of whether those two objectives were discordant. In particular, this study
estimated the relationship between casino tax rates and short-run casino development
(proxied by labor measures). In this chapter, a conclusion of the study is provided.
Empirical findings and their relevance are discussed, followed by an overview of the
study’s limitations, and suggestions for future research.
Discussion
To date, no study has provided an empirically sound estimate of the effect that
casino excise taxes have on the decisions made by firms. Using an estimation method
that controlled for potential endogeneity in the selection of a tax rate, this study found
strong evidence that maximum gross gaming revenue taxes have an adverse effect on
casino employment. The study revealed an elasticity of roughly -0.5, with the entire
95% confidence interval lying in the inelastic range [-0.81,-0.11]. Using these esti-
mates, policy makers should be able to make a more informed decision about what
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casino tax rate will maximize the overall welfare of their constituents. Even in a model
that ignores wider welfare effects and strictly focuses on public revenue maximization,
these results will be helpful since the direct tax revenue from the gaming excise tax can
now be integrated into a wider model of the economy and compared to the change in
indirect tax revenue (e.g. resulting changes in employment related income or payroll
taxes).
Although the study found strong evidence of the effect of the maximum tax rate
on casino employment, it failed to find a similar impact by the effective tax rate. Effec-
tive tax rates do not represent any particular marginal tax rate paid by casinos, whereas
the maximum tax rate is typically the marginal rate paid by the largest casinos. If this
insignificant finding is not a Type II error, this provides empirical evidence to support
the theory that quasi-specific taxes (such as admission fees or fixed transaction fees on
wagers) will be less distortive than ad valorem excise taxes, suggesting potential re-
forms to the method in which taxes are levied on the gaming industry. Currently, these
tend to be used only in limited capacity (Anderson, 2005).
Given the evidence discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the difference in sensitivity
to price of problem and non-problem gamblers, reforms may be even more important.
The implication is that an increased reliance on ad valorem taxes to generate revenue
from the gaming industry will disproportionally cause more of the public revenue to
come from problem gamblers. This is the opposite effect desired if policy makers are
attempting to force problem gamblers to internalize the negative externalities caused
by their consumption and their related health issues. However, the effective tax rate
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may suffer from an endogenous selection issue that affects entry and therefore biased
the analysis towards an insignificant result. In particular, potential firms may not enter
the market due to high effective rates, but once committed to operating through heavy
capital investments, many of these taxes become sunk costs. Therefore, the effective tax
rate may have a indirect effect on employment through the already controlled ’Number
of Casinos’ variable.
No significant effect was found from the admission tax variable, but this lack of
significance was due to methodological limitations. The fixed effect and year dummy
variables were excessively collinear with the admission tax dummy variables, forcing
them to be removed from the model. This over controlling was necessary to remove
endogenous effects on the other tax variables, but came at the expense of the findings
on this particular variable. However, the discussion in Chapter 2 suggests that the use
of admission taxes may be a more effective tax design than ad valorem taxes on gross
gaming revenue. Due to the differences in the sensitivity of problem gamblers and non-
problems gamblers to price, an increased reliance on ad valorem taxes to generate pub-
lic revenue may disproportionally cause more of the public revenue to come from prob-
lem gamblers and tend to distort the behavior of non-problem gamblers into consum-
ing other goods. Accordingly, admission taxes may lead to less distortions in behavior
versus other forms of gambling taxes. Alternatively, if a Becker-Murphy (1988) ratio-
nal addiction model is employed, ad valorem taxes may be more effective at efficiently
curbing addictive behavior.
No robust relationship was found between maximum GGR taxes and real com-
72
mercial casino wages. This was a surprising result given that a significant relationship
was found with taxes and employment, and given that real wages are simply the prod-
uct of employment and the real average wage. This non-finding could have been caused
by the somewhat related issues of a poorly specified empirical model, a counterveil-
ing movement in the real wage rate that hid the effects on employment, and generally
noisier data than in the employment model (or equivalently, an insufficiently large data
sample to produce consistent estimates). It seems plausible that an increase (decrease)
in the tax rate is responded to by a decrease (increase) in the employment level – the
main significant finding of this study – which is then abated by an increase (decrease)
in the average wage, which causes this result. For example, a casino that increased
employment in response to a reduction in their tax rate may no longer have to rely as
heavily on overtime shifts by their staff to accommodate spikes in demand, and there-
fore will have a reduced average wage. Although a study with a larger sample may be
able to capture this potentially smaller effect of taxes on real total wages, the standard
errors in this sample were too large to reject the null hypothesis on the tax rate coeffi-
cient.
Limitations
The purpose of this study was to examine how casino excise taxes affect casino
development, but this study only examined part of this relationship. In particular, this
study focused on how gaming revenue taxes affected measures of labor – employment
and wages – but not long-term capital investment. As such, the empirical findings in
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this study tend to reflect short-run effects of the change in tax rates, as opposed to
long-run effects. Given the large financial investments that are made in modern resort-
style casinos, the long-run effects of changes in tax rates may take years or decades
to occur, therefore accurately estimating these empirical effects is not easily done, but
certainly worth pursuing.
This study was limited by its use of data that was aggregated by state, as op-
posed to more meaningful firm level data. In part, the inability to detect a significant
coefficient from the effective tax rate may be a function of the use of aggregated data
figures. Gaming data aggregated at the state level does not reflect the effective tax rate
of any particular firm, but is an average across all firms in the state. Conversely, maxi-
mum tax rates – where a significant coefficient was found – may be more robust to this
source of error since that rate represents the actual rate paid by many firms. In general,
the use of this aggregated data should decrease the probability of a Type I error, but
increase the probability of a Type II error.
Data was also aggregated by year, which creates measurement issues when vari-
ables of interest change during the year in a way that cannot be obviously captured em-
pirically. For example, the maximum tax rate variable is measured at the end of the
calendar year, changes caused by this variable that occur for only part of the calendar
year will not be fully captured.
The data used in this study was limited to states with U.S. commercial casinos.
As such, the empirical estimates may have bias if extrapolated to other jurisdictions or
other forms of gaming (e.g. video lottery terminals or slot parlors). If there is a non-
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orthogonal relationship between the adoption of legal commercial casino gaming and
the estimated empirical relationships, a selection bias may also be introduced into the
estimates. A selection model may be a useful remedy in that case to produce unbiased
results, e.g. Heckman (1979).
Another data limitation is that the sampling frame of this study relied on the
somewhat arbitrary definition of a commercial casino by the AGA. Nevertheless, using
a well-established industry organization like the AGA should be a more reliable means
to define sampling frame boundaries than a capricious designation on a state-by-state
basis. The definitions of commercial casinos were additionally examined in each year
that the AGA produced their state of the state reports to ensure consistency over time
(which resulted in the exclusion of 2010 data that amalgamated various racetrack casi-
nos into the aggregate data). The labor figures acquired from the AGA should also be
subject to some scrutiny, since the industry organization has a particular incentive to
publicize the positive economic impacts of the gaming industry. However, the various
labor reports produced by the AGA have generally been found to be acceptable over
the course of their 15 year production period, therefore there is no obvious reason to
consider the figures especially dubious.
For the majority of the data analysis, no useful proxies of the size of the tribal
gaming industry were available as control variables. In Table 13, limited analysis was
conducted with a proxy variable (number of in state tribal casinos), which did not ap-
pear to lead to coefficients meaningfully different from those in other models – the
maximum tax rate elasticity remained significant, negative, and inelastic. Neverthe-
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less, this was a small sample size that did not include any instrumental variables, so the
comparison was not ideal. Similarly, the availability of gaming (tribal and otherwise)
in neighboring jurisdictions, online, or at non-commercial casinos may affect the de-
pendent variable and were not able to be control directly. To the extent that the general
proxy variables (fixed effects and year dummy variables) and instruments fail to control
for endogeneity, the coefficients on variables may be biased.
Future Research
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a useful extension of this study
would be to integrate it into a wider model of the economy. Such an extension would
yield powerful information for decision makers, by allowing for more accurate esti-
mates of the costs and benefits of changes in casino tax policy. Qualitative case study
analyses would also be useful to better understand the decision making processes that
occur within firms as a result of changes in tax policy. They may yield useful informa-
tion to adapt government policies, and provide guidance for future empirical tests.
A similar analysis using firm level data would likely yield more precise esti-
mates since actual marginal tax rates could be used as part of the study. Such an ap-
proach may reveal significant relationships among variables that were tested but found
to have insignificant relationships, e.g. effective tax rates and employment. Firm level
data would also be useful in attempting to estimate tax effects on long-run investment
decisions, such as capital allocation. Such analysis could benefit from an ability to
closely examine accounting data figures. Using firm level data, a full panel of the U.S.
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may not be entirely necessary, as relatively straightforward difference-in-difference
studies could yield accurate estimates.
A quantile method for examining the effects that taxes have on casino operator
incentives would also be useful, since this would yield non-average elasticity effects.
At a certain threshold, increases in the tax rate fail to increase total tax revenue (Laffer,
2004), and quantile regression would provide more evidence where this inflection point
in the Laffer curve may exist.
Admission taxes deserve further study, as their effect on both operator and con-
sumer incentives is interesting. In a jurisdiction with a 20% GGR tax and an average
10% theoretical win, $500 in coin-in would be required to generate the same per player
tax revenue as a $10 admission tax. Given the limited use of admission taxes in the
U.S. casino industry, an empirical test of how behavior changes in response to these
different excise taxes could yield evidence of many potential pareto improvements.
Finally, expanding this study beyond commercial casinos would be useful in or-
der to increase reliability and generalizability of the findings. Tribal gaming, lotteries,
video lottery terminals, online casinos, and other forms of gaming all may react in dif-
ferent ways to changes in their cost structure, and this is worth exploring. For example,
the global competitiveness of online gaming may exacerbate the sensitivity of those
firms behavior to changes in the tax rate. Understanding these subtleties will be impor-
tant for the development of an overall understanding of best practices in gaming policy
design.
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